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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-DUTY OF TRIAL JUDGE WHEN DE-
FENDANT OBJECTS TO COMPETENCY OF HIS COUNSEL
State v. Deal, 17 Ohio State 2d 17 (1969)
Deal, the defendant, was indicted on three counts of armed
robbery. He was represented by a lawyer appointed by the trial
court. After the state had rested its case the defendant, in open
court, attempted to discharge his counsel. At this point the court
recessed the jury and Deal placed his complaint in the record.
He gave his reasons as the following:
"I'm not getting fair representation. Give me three
weeks and I will be ready to go to trial. I asked this man
(his attorney) to file a motion which was not filed. I asked
this man to subpoena my witnesses and they are not here in
court-that's not fair, that's not giving me no kind of trial." '
The court rejected the defendant's complaint, deeming it "be-
lated and unreasonable in view of the fact that defendant had not
indicated any dissatisfaction with his counsel until the state had
rested." 2 The jury returned and the trial then proceeded. When
asked if he wished to take the stand, the defendant replied that
he "would like to, but that he would not do it without having any
counsel to examine him and that he would not consider going on
with the attorney he had been assigned." 3 Closing arguments
were waived and the case was then submitted to the jury, which
found the defendant guilty. With a new attorney the defendant
appealed to the Franklin County Court of Appeals who sub-
sequently affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, per Justice
Schneider, and remanded the case to the Court of Common Pleas
for re-investigation.
Since the decision in Powell v. Alabama4 many cases have
been adjudicated setting forth various substantive rules defining
and determining the competency of counsel. On first impression
one would view the Deal case as following this line-i.e. the
Supreme Court reversed on the ground that defendant was in-
directly denied the right to counsel. Indirectly, because if de-
1 State v. Deal, 17 Ohio State 2d 17 (1969).
2 Id. at 18.
3 Ibid.
4 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932).
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fendant's counsel was incompetent, the effect of such incom-
petency would be comparable to having no counsel at all. But
after carefully analyzing Deal one will realize that the Supreme
Court was not speaking in terms of substantive denial of counsel
as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In
effect, they were setting forth a procedure that the trial court
must follow if the defendant alleges an objection to the com-
petency of his counsel. This procedure involves the following
considerations:
1. When must the defendant object to the competency of his
counsel?
The Supreme Court considered an objection to be timely
lodged if made when the state rested its case. The court dis-
tinguished the Deal case from Tompsett v. Ohio,5 where the de-
fendant made his objection for the first time on appeal. The fail-
ure to object at trial was deemed by the appellate court to indi-
cate that the defendant acquiesced in the performance of his
counsel. In order for a defendant to preserve his objection to
counsel on appeal the law currently requires that defendant as-
sert his objection at some time during the trial. This rule must
be modified in light of the recent Cuyahoga County Court of
Appeals decision in State v. Cutcher.6 There the defendant
moved for a new trial on the ground of inadequate and ineffec-
tive representation by counsel. The motion was made at the end
of the trial. The appellate court ruled that such objection was
timely. It then found that defendant was denied adequate coun-
sel and reversed the conviction. Thus, it would seem that the
latest time that one could object and preserve such right for ap-
peal would be on a motion for new trial at the trial level. To
raise such an objection initially on appeal would seem to be too
late in light of the Tompsett holding, which is still considered
good law today.
2. May the defendant allege such incompetency in general terms
or must he state the specific instances?
The defendant should specify the ways in which his attorney
has failed to properly represent him. In Deal the defendant spe-
cifically complained of the following: (1) His counsel did not file
notice of alibi defenses; (2) His counsel did not subpoena wit-
5 Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F. 2d 95 (C.A. 6th Ohio 1944).
6 State v. Cutcher, 17 Ohio App. 2d 107 (1969).
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nesses that the defendant felt were necessary for his defense.
Justice Schneider noted: "His (defendant's) objection was spe-
cific, not vague or general." - Judge Corrigan in Cutcher noted,
"Present counsel for the defendant cites several instances in the
course of the trial which he argues demonstrate inadequate and
ineffective representation by the trial court defense counsel." 8
Therefore, rather than generally allege that his lawyer is inade-
quate the defendant would be more prudent to cite specific acts
and/or omissions demonstrating incompetency.
3. What is the duty of the trial judge when the defendant objects
to the competency of his counsel?
In the principal case the court declared:
"In these circumstances we think it was the trial court's
duty to put its own objection into the record. . . . In other
words, before continuing with the trial the court should have
made it clear in the record whether the appellant's (defend-
ant's) action was an arbitrary failure to go forward or a
legitimate claim of inadequate representation." 9
Obviously, from the quoted statement, Justice Schneider felt that
the Supreme Court had no way of knowing whether or not the
objection was valid. The record failed to reveal why there was
no alibi defense filed or why there were no defense witnesses
called. The record being silent, one could hypothesize that ap-
pointed counsel talked to defendant's witnesses and felt that their
testimony would be of no avail. Moreover, it is possible that after
appointed counsel investigated the alibi defense he found it use-
less. It is here, to this third issue, that the force of the Supreme
Court's decision must be guided. It is fundamental in reviewing
procedures that the reviewing court is limited to what does ap-
pear in the record. It must logically follow that if a defendant
objects to the inadequacy of counsel on the grounds that his
counsel failed to do certain necessary things, and if the record
does not reveal whether defendant's counsel did or did not do
them-or whether he was justified in not doing them-then such
a record is worthless. For under these circumstances the review-
ing court cannot determine whether or not defendant's counsel
was competent.
7 State v. Deal, supra note 1, at 19.
8 State v. Cutcher, supra note 6, at 108.
9 State v. Deal, supra note 1, at 19.
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The Supreme Court opinion addressed itself to this situation,
stating that when a defendant objects to the competency of his
counsel the trial judge must immediately stop the proceedings.
The judge must then conduct an investigation to determine
whether or not the defendant's claims are legitimate. The re-
sults of this investigation must then be placed in the record of
the trial proceedings. This procedure will guarantee the defend-
ant's "right to counsel safeguards" at the trial level. If the trial
judge does find defendant's claims to be legitimate, he will be
able to rectify the situation immediately by either appointing
new counsel or declaring a mistrial.10 Since all of this will be
done at the trial level, the defendant will avoid wasting time and
incurring unnecessary expense.
Lastly, if the trial judge's investigation discloses that the
defendant's claim is without merit, the appellate court will have
an opportunity to review such a finding, since the investigation
(the manner in which it was conducted and the means by which
the trial judge reached his decision) will appear in the record.
The importance of this procedure becomes evident when one
considers the action taken by the Franklin County Court of Ap-
peals, which affirmed the defendant's conviction on the basis of
a record which failed to reveal whether or not defendant's claims
of inadequate representation were legitimate. Particularly in
view of the vast number of cases which have declared the sub-
stantive law on what constitutes competent representation by
counsel, State v. Deal is a welcome decision. It is obvious that
justice cannot be served when a defendant makes a timely ob-
jection to the adequacy of his counsel and the trial judge over.
rules the objection without investigating its validity.
NICHOLAS T. GEORGE
10 This is not intended to suggest that these are the only proper courses
open to the trial judge.
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